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I solve the discrete dynamic decision of sales agents’ effort allocation under a quota 
bonus compensation when the carryover from the past period is introduced in sales. 
With the solution of dynamic programming, I generate the sales data from two 
segments of sales agents: one with high risk-aversion and the other with low risk-
aversion. As the carryover in sales increases both the expected mean and variance of 
sales in the next period, the sales agent’s optimal effort allocation and thus the 
realized sales pattern vary according to his degree of risk aversion. The highly risk-
averse set the baseline of performance while the less risk averse fluctuate their sales 
above the highly risk-averse. Also, the frequency of achieving quotas is higher in the 
less risk averse group compared to the highly risk-averse group. These different 
patterns could be interpreted as that the highly risk averse try not to exert more effort 
to avoid the uncertainty from the increased sales.  
Following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), I estimate the segment-wise optimal effort 
functions and utility functions in two steps: calculating the conditional choice 
probability with nonparametric functions and then searching for parameters with EM 
algorithm. The estimation result shows that ignoring the carryover when it exists 
gives out poor estimates of the number and even the size of segments. This is because 
ignoring carryover results in the wrong segmenting of the sales agents from the first 
stage estimation and thus affects the second stage estimation subsequently. The result 
highlights the necessity of considering carryover when understanding sales force’s 
performance history from the sales data if carryover exists. Neglecting carryover 
might lead to wrong segmentation of sales force and thus the inefficient design of 
segment-wise compensation plans. 
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Personal selling is a crucial part of the marketing mix. In US economy in 2006, at 
least 20 million people were involved in sales (Zoltners et al. 2008). The total 
investment in sales force was as high as over $800 billion, which was close to three 
times the $285 billion spent on advertising in 2006 (Zoltners et al. 2008).  
 This significance has brought about the needs to design the optimal 
compensation scheme for the practitioners. However, to design an efficient 
compensation scheme that incentivizes a sales force to exert its full effort is difficult 
because managers can only observe the proxy of effort, the performance outcomes 
with noise (i.e. sales performance). This means that a sales force could be 
incentivized to shirk behind the performance incommensurate to effort incurring a 
cost to him while the efficient compensation scheme is to induce full effort.  
 One possible performance outcome that a sales force could shirk behind is 
sales carryover. The sales carryover refers to the process in which a significant 
portion of the given year’s sales volume is not due to efforts of the sales force in the 
given year but is a function of the prior year’s selling efforts and other factors 
(Madhani 2011). These factors include marketing mix variables, unique product 
characteristics, market competition, customer relationship strategies, regulatory 
requirements, government regulation, general market conditions, increased 
promotional and advertising expenditure, a particularly excellent product or 
attractive pricing (Madhani 2011). There are some industries with notably high sales 
carryover rates, such as pharmaceuticals, financial services, office equipment, or 
professional software (Zoltners et al. 2006). According to a study of 50 
pharmaceutical companies in 6 countries with sales forces ranging in size from 35 to 
several thousand, the aggregate carryover sales from selling efforts in one year was 
75% to 80% the next year, 62% to 78% in the third year and 52% to 70% in the 
fourth year (Sinha and Zoltners 2001). This study attributed high carryover rates in 
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pharmaceutical industries to physicians’ reluctance to switch patients from 
medications that are working.  
 As the carryover sales increase the sales agent’s temptation to shirk (Rubel 
and Prasad 2016), it makes the compensation plans lose some efficiencies in 
incentivizing full effort. Due to the unobservability of the effort as well as the 
complexities in selling process between a sales force and its customer, the managers 
find it hard to estimate the exact sales carryover rate and to reflect it in the 
compensation contract. The result is that sales force could easily consider a portion 
of commissions as a hidden or free salary (Madhani 2011).  
 Besides the carryover sales, the non-linear compensation structure adds up 
the complexities and the inefficiencies in incentivizing effort. The non-linearity of 
compensation structure could give sales agents incentives to time the allocation of 
effort. A forward-looking sales agent would maximize his expected utilities by 
“gaming” in effort allocation considering his current decision making affects the 
future compensation. For example, the most commonly used compensation, which 
is quota-based compensation, generates a perverse incentive to the sales force who 
already achieve the quota to postpone additional effort to the future (Misra and Nair 
2011). If the bonus payment from quota achievement is big enough and marginal 
income for sales beyond the quota is small enough, a sales agent might keep his 
effort in a given compensation cycle after earning bonus and exert the saved effort 
in the next compensation cycle to gain another bonus rather than exhaust all his effort 
every time. This gaming behavior could be reinforced if the marginal gain for sales 
beyond the quota is zero (i.e. ceiling in the compensation).  
 How does the effort allocation of a sales agent under a non-linear 
compensation contract change if there are significant carryover sales? This paper 
starts with the above question. If carryover sales are significant, a forward-looking 
sales agent will start to consider the longer effect of his selling effort. He might still 
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exert some effort after achieving the quota, by reckoning that his current effort with 
little or even minus current income (i.e. the marginal cost of exerting effort is bigger 
than the marginal income earned for realizing sales) would be compensated by 
increased probability of gaining another bonus from carryover sales in the next 
compensation cycle. Without carryover sales, after achieving the quota, he might 
lose the motivation to put in extra effort till the next compensation cycle comes. The 
difference would be stark if sales beyond the quota give no marginal income and the 
quota is set high with a big bonus.  
 One variable that comes to be the fore in introducing carryover effect is sales 
agents’ risk aversion. As carryover sales increase the mean and also the variance of 
the future sales, a sales agent’ risk aversion acts on his optimal effort allocation 
decision. How much he could endure the increased variance of future sales from 
carryover sales would affect how he exerts his effort in every period. Thus, this paper 
allows the sales agent’s heterogeneity over risk aversion. Rubel and Prasad (2016) 
found that forward-looking sales agents need different optimal compensation 
according to their risk aversion degrees with the restraint that the optimal 
compensation should be monotonically increasing. Thus, this paper is the extension 
of their idea with non-linear and not monotonically increasing compensation plan.  
 Among several combinations in the non-linear compensation schemes, this 
paper chooses to focus on quota and bonus combination because of its popularity. 
The quotas and bonuses are used in more than 75% of firms in industries (Joseph 
and Kalwani 1998). Also, according to the 2008 Incentive Practices Research Study 
by ZS Associates, 73%, 85%, and 89% of firms in pharma/biotech, medical devices, 
and high-tech industries, respectively, use quota-based compensation (Training 
2008). Considering that the pharmaceutical industry has popularly used quota-based 
compensation plan and it has quite high sales carryover, analyzing dynamic effort 
allocation with carryover sales under the quota and bonus compensation would be 
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practically meaningful for at least the pharmaceutical industry. And there could be a 
lot of areas which popularly use quota-based compensation for their sales agents and 
have high rates of carryover sales.  
 In sum, this paper deals with dynamic effort allocation of sales agents with 
heterogeneous risk aversion degrees under quota and bonus compensation when 
carryover sales are introduced. The specific questions the paper deals are 1) how 
does the effort allocations of forward-looking sales agents vary across their risk 
aversion degrees? and 2) if the managers ignore carryover sales, could they segment 
precisely their sales agents varying across risk aversion from seeing the realized sales 
performance?  
 I set forward-looking sales agents in quota and bonus compensation 
structure and predict their effort allocation decisions by solving dynamic 
programming. The heterogeneity in risk aversion across sales agents is reflected in 
segment-wise effort allocations. From the segment-wise effort allocations, I generate 
the simulated sales data to try estimation of main parameters and followingly 
segmentation of sales agents with two-stage dynamic programming estimation using 
EM algorithm.  
 In Chapter 2, I address some historical points of literature regarding sales 
force compensation and forward-looking agents. In Chapter 3, detailed settings and 
explanation of model are introduced, and in Chapter 4 I point out the reason of 
embracing risk aversion degree in the main model. Followingly, I address data 
generation by solving single agent dynamic programming in Chapter 5 and 
estimation of main parameters with two-stage EM based dynamic programming 
estimation method in Chapter 6. Then, Chapter 7 explains the result of estimation 
and Chapter 8 closes the paper with general discussion.  
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2. Literature Review 
There has been a wide range of research on sales force compensation. Starting from 
Holmstrom (1979), the widely used “standard” framework to understand the 
contracting relationship between the sales manager and the sales agent has been the 
principal-agent framework. Holmstrom’s model describes a contract between a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent in a risky production process. As only the 
output of production is observable while the input of the agent is not, there arise the 
information asymmetry resulting in the second-best contract.  
 Following Holmstrom (1979), the dynamics in principal-agent models were 
first taken notice for the non-aligned interest between principal and agents and the 
mitigation of moral hazard was mostly examined. Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and 
Radner (1981) studied an infinitely repeated problem in which neither the principal 
nor the agent discounts the future. In these cases, both the principal and the agent 
could get the same amounts of expected utilities as their first best outcomes, and 
therefore moral hazard is completely overcome. Lambert (1983) examined the 
repeated problem with discounting noting that optimal contract depends on the entire 
previous history of the relationship. He interpreted the intertemporal arrangements 
as a smoothing of incomes across periods for agents which is similar to an insurance 
mechanism.  
 These multi-period examinations in principal-agent models soon started to 
highlight the manipulation of inputs by sales agents and the effect of compensation 
scheme on it. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) made Mirrless (1974)’s two-wage 
nonlinear compensation contract, i.e. a fixed wage unless output is very low or a very 
low wage for very low output, precise by providing its variant in which the agent 
chooses his labor input over time in response to observations of how well he is doing. 
The authors showed that assuming the agent has an exponential utility function and 
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controls the drift rate of a Brownian motion over the unit time interval in continuous 
time model, the optimal incentive scheme was derived as linear in output because 
the agent would choose a constant drift rate independently of the path of output. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom interpreted it as because the two-wage scheme leads the 
agent to work hard only when that appears necessary to avoid a disaster, that a linear 
scheme applying the same incentive pressure on the agent no matter what his past 
performance has been is proved optimal. Later, Lal and Srinivasan (1993) 
corroborated Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) with further comparative statics 
results. Lal and Srinivasan (1993) additionally derived that the commission income 
as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of 
the sales-effort while the salary component goes up with increases in uncertainty, 
absolute risk aversion, marginal cost of production, perceived cost of effort, and 
alternative job opportunities for the sales agents.  
 However, the literature could not easily fill the gap between analytically 
optimal compensation plans and ubiquitous simple nonlinear plans in practice. The 
attempts to address the nonlinearity have gone deep and broad. Oyer (1998) 
empirically showed that discrete bonuses and other nonlinearities in compensation 
could lead sales agents to take actions that maximize their expected income over 
several pay cycles. He used the aggregate sales across different industries in different 
quarters and concluded that the effect of fiscal year ends combined with the nonlinear 
incentive contracts undermines the attempts to smooth production by leading 
employees to take actions that affect firm seasonality. More recently, Steenburgh 
(2008) showed that an aggregate analysis might have concluded in the opposite 
direction regarding the effect of quotas in compensation compared to that of Oyer 
(1998). In analytically, Oyer (2000) showed that with the strong assumption that the 
sales agent has a liability limitation and participation constraint does not bind, 
optimal compensation is derived to be a discrete bonus for meeting a quota. He 
interpreted this result as because sales agent’s skills are most valuable in a sales 
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context, the agent cannot expect comparable compensation in other professions, 
allowing firms to select the least expensive compensation plan without concern for 
insuring that the salesperson will participate, while inducing the optimal level of the 
sales agent’s effort by concentrating marginal compensation on sales that maximize 
the additional revenue from additional effort.  
 While addressing the reason of popularity of quota in practice, the sales force 
literature got favored from detailed real data. The later empirical research directed 
to new and minute focus on individual worker’s productivity with the acquisition of 
the detailed performance outcomes associated with every processed check of each 
sales agent while previous literature dealt aggregate sales force productivity. 
Copeland and Monnet (2009) tracked a worker’s productivity at a very fine level of 
detail within the day where bonuses are calculated on a daily basis, and a worker 
starts each day anew. Using these fine data, the authors modeled and estimated the 
worker’s dynamic effort decision problem.  
 More recent analysis on within period dynamics in sales agent’s effort 
allocation adopted the forward-looking behavior from solving dynamic 
programming. The two recent and utmost literatures are Misra and Nair (2011) and 
Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir (2014). They both showed the forward-looking 
behaviors of sales agents under compensation plans with quotas using dynamic 
programming approaches. They both dealt with compensation structures consisting 
of quotas, however with different focuses. Misra and Nair analyzed quotas with 
floors and ceilings on commissions and concluded that quotas reduce performance. 
According to them, two characteristics of the quotas were important: First, the quota 
ceiling limits the effort of the most productive salespeople, who would normally 
have exceeded that ceiling. Second, the company followed an explicit policy of 
ratcheting quotas based on past productivity. This reduced salespeople’s incentives 
to work hard in any given period, because hard work was penalized through higher 
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future quotas. However, Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir focused on quotas with 
bonuses and concluded that when coupled with bonuses, quotas enhance 
performance. Their compensation scheme included the overachievement 
commissions for exceeding quotas and group quota updates minimized the ratcheting 
effects.  
 In the methodological perspective, two papers followed the recent advance 
in dynamic programming computation: two-step conditional choice probability 
estimation. The two-step CCP estimation approaches have recently gained popularity 
because of their ease of computation relative to traditional nested fixed point 
approaches. The main difference in methodologies between the two papers is 
whether it allows heterogeneity in the model. Misra and Nair avoided the unobserved 
heterogeneity issue by estimating each salesperson’s utility function separately, 
while Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir followed Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to 
allow heterogeneity within the two-step framework.  
 In my setting, I followed Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir in methodological 
perspectives but with different quota-bonus plans. I set ceiling in compensation 
above quota similar to Misra and Nair. This is because I want to see the carryover 
effect drawing effort even without marginal gains from achieving more above quotas. 
Thus, the ceiling in compensation works as a significant factor inducing further 
dynamics in the model. And for simplicity, here I ignore the ratcheting effect of sales 
compensation.  
 The further layer of complexity in sales agent literature was addressed in 
Rubel and Prasad (2015). The authors cast light upon the unexplored problem of 
carryover in sales response model. According to their analytical paper, if carryover 
effect exists, but the compensation plan is designed without recognizing it, then the 
firm will lose money because it compensates sales generated through carryover as 
well as effort, but attributes sales only to effort. With differential equations, they 
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discovered that the degree of risk aversion of a salesperson, relative to the noisiness 
of the sales response function, plays an important role in determining the effort 
strategy of the salesperson and the optimal contract in the presence of carryover 
effects. This insight manifests because the carryover effect increases both the mean 
and the variance of future sales. As a result, they found that the shape of optimal 
compensation plan is convex in sales for a low risk-aversion salesperson and concave 
in sales for a high risk-aversion salesperson.  
 The main difference between my setting and Rubel and Prasad’s is that I 
focused on the forward-looking behavior of sales agents under quota-bonus with 
ceiling compensation structures while they focused on the effort allocation between 
in new business and existing business and derived the equilibrium with firm’s 
optimal contracts among monotonically increasing plans. Here, I focus only on the 
distorted effort allocation of sales agents derived from the mixture of carryover and 
quota-bonus structures and see whether introducing carryover effects in sales affects 
the estimation of dynamic structural parameters with heterogeneity in risk aversion 
of sales agents. 
 
3. Model 
Consider an infinite horizon with time discounting where the sales agent is 
compensated every period. Given the states at the beginning of time t, the sales agent 
exerts his optimal selling effort, weighing the expected income from future periods 
against the cost of effort. The sales at time t are realized based on his level of selling 
effort and the market random error. This realized sales become his selling 
performance at time t. At the end of time t, the sales agent is compensated according 
to his performance at time t under a particular compensation scheme. Followingly, 
10 
 
the states are updated in the beginning of time (𝑡 + 1), which affects the decision 
making in the next period.   
 Here, I assume that the sales agent participates in the infinite cycle of 
realizing sales and getting compensation. In my simulated model, reservation wage 
is set to minus infinite, which implies that once participating in, the sales agent never 
gets out of the cycle. This assumption is restrictive because I focus only on perpetual 
sales agents. While literatures have handled getting out of the cycle by normalizing 
the reservation wage as zero, here I ignore any chance of getting out of the sales field. 
Considering getting in and out of the firm, future research could extend to the 
function of the compensation scheme as I will discuss later.  
 As in common practices, I assume that the agent is risk-averse and there is 
no private information. Also, the firm or manager cannot observe the sales agents’ 
effort directly, rather it could infer the unobserved effort only from the realized sales 
data. I first summarize the notation of variables and parameters in Table 1 and Table 
2. 
Table 1. Variables 
name explanation range 
State variables 
𝑀𝑡 Period type at time t {1, 2, 3} 
𝑆𝑡 Sales at time t [0.10, 12.18] 
𝑙𝑆𝑡 ln⁡(Salest): log representation of realized sales at time t [-2.3, 2.5] 
𝑄𝑡 Percentage cumulative quota achievement at time t [0, 3.65] 
Action variables  
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡 Effort of sales agent at time t [0, 1] 
Utility variables  
𝑊𝑡 Income of sales agent at time t (−∞,+∞) 
𝑈𝑡 Utility of sales agent at time t (−∞,+∞) 
𝑉𝑡 Expected future utilities under optimal effort policy at time t (−∞,+∞) 
Random variables 




Table 2. Parameters 
name explanation true 
Sales Response Function 
λ Carryover rate 0.5 
𝜎 Degree of market variation 0.01 
Compensation Scheme  
𝑟 Commission rate  0.01 
𝑞 Quota  10 
𝐵 Lump-sum Bonus 0.1 
Utility Function 
𝛾 Risk aversion factor (high risk aversion/ low risk aversion) 2.5 / 0.001 
𝑐 Unit cost of exerting effort 0.05 
Value Function 
δ Time discount factor 0.95 
 
3.1. Sales Dynamics 
I define the sales response function as the equation (1) following Rubel and Prasad 
(2015).  
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡|𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + √𝜎𝜖𝑡,⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒⁡⁡0 < 𝜆 < 1⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.⁡⁡𝑁(0,1)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
Rubel and Prasad adapted the canonical Nerlov-Arrow model (1962) to define the 
continuous sales rate. While Nerlov-Arrow model addressed the decay in advertising 
with the factor of (1 − 𝜆) using the differential equation in a deterministic way, 
Rubel and Prasad added a stochastic term in the differential equation. Rubel and 




𝑣(𝑡) − (1 − 𝜆)𝑥(𝑡) + √𝜎𝜖(𝑡), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒⁡⁡𝑥(0) = 𝑥0 . In their model, (1 − 𝜆)𝑥(𝑡) is 
the decayed sales from the previous period as in Nerlov-Arrow model. And 𝑣(𝑡) 
represents the sales agent’s selling effort. For the stochastic term, 𝜖(𝑡) is the demand 
shock, and 𝜎 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
) is the noisiness of the sales response. Thus, the change 
12 
 
of sales at time t consists of sales agent’s effort at time t, decayed sales from the 
previous period and unspecified demand shock. Since subtracting the amount of 
decay is the same as adding the amount of carryover, the second term in Rubel and 
Prasad’s also could be interpreted as the carryover from the previous period.  
 Here as shown in (1), I adapt Rubel and Prasad’s model in a discretized way 
with the log-transformed sales, 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆) rather than the realized sales, 𝑆 itself. If we 
take the logarithmic transformation of sales in the sales response equation (1), 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆) 
frees us from the truncation issue in calculating conditional probabilities and still is 
realistic as the realized sales 𝑆 are restricted above zero. 
 The three components in the sales response function are the same as in Rubel 
and Prasad but in a discretized way. First, the optimal selling effort is the function of 
effort the sales agent exerts in time t and is conditional on the state variables. The 
agent first looks at the state variables at time t and decides which degree of effort to 
exert considering the cost of effort and the expected income. This part represents 
each sales agent’s decision-making process regarding the degree of effort to exert. 
Second, the carryover from previous sales is restricted with the factor of 𝜆 ranging 
in (0, 1). Following Rubel and Prasad, the carryover factor 𝜆 is a constant and only 
one time lagged sales are considered for carryover. The constant carryover factor 
might ignore the heterogeneity in buyer-sales agent relationships or in the deals of 
different time periods. Moreover in reality, it would be more plausible to consider 
that some sales contracts have longer effects than just one period. However, here we 
put the strong assumption of constant 𝜆 and attain the simplest form of sales response 
model. Thus 𝜆 could be interpreted as the market average carryover rate. Lastly, the 
market variation follows the identically independent normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance of 𝜎. The sales agents share the same market variation at time t, 
which rules out any geographical variation in sales or any private information of 
market. Also, as the market variation is independent at the different time, the model 
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also rules out any market seasonality. Thus, besides the same market error unknown 
to all sales agents and individually expected carryover from the previous sales, the 
realized sales in the next period should be explained only with the function v of 
unobserved effort term⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 by individual i.   
3.2. Compensation Contract 
At the end of time t, the sales agent i realizes 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and earns⁡𝑊𝑖,𝑡 based on his 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 
the compensation plan which he agrees to work under. I design the compensation 
plan following Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir (2014). Chung et al (2014) 
empirically argued the role of a quota as a pacemaker for the sales agent with middle 
achievement and the incentive of an overachievement commission for the sales agent 
with high achievement. The compensation scheme in their data is comprised of a 
linear commission, a lumpsum bonus for sales above a quota and an 
overachievement commission. I basically follow their compensation structure but 
omit overachievement commission. The modification is to distinguish the carryover 
effect on sales agent’s forward-looking behavior from the incentives of 
overachievement commission. With no overachievement commission, only the 
carryover interprets why the sales agent exerts effort even after accomplishing the 
quota while he earns no marginal gain for sales above the quota at that period: the 
sales agent is expecting the increased gain in the next cycle due to the carryover. 
Therefore, by omitting the overachievement commission, I could identify the 
forward-looking behavior of sales agents in their performance after achieving the 
quota.  
 To observe the dynamic effort allocation of sales agents, I design three-
period cycle of compensation structure. In the start of every first period, the 
cumulative quota achievement is renewed as zero and the sales agent earns linear 
commission for the sales he realizes. He earns the linear commission in every second 
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period, also. In every third period, the bonus payment is given if the cumulative 
achievement during the first, second and third period is above the quota, or he earns 
only the linear commission for the sales he makes in the third period.  
 Below is the specific earning 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 ⁡ under the compensation contract I 









The sales agent i earns 𝑟𝑆𝑖,𝑡  for period 1 and period 2 where 𝑟  is the linear 
commission rate. And in period 3, the sales agent earns 𝑟𝑆𝑖,𝑡 if he does not achieve 
the quota or he earns a lumpsum bonus, 𝑟𝑞 + 𝐵.⁡ 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the sales agent i’s percentage 
of quota achievement till the end of period t in a cycle. 
 Different from Misra and Nair (2011), ratcheting effect from updating the 
compensation scheme based on previous performance is not considered. The 
compensation contract never changes, thus there is no uncertainty on the 
compensation contract itself.  
3.3. Sales agent’s Per-Period Utility 
I define the utility function of sales agent i at time t as below. 
𝑈𝑖,𝑡(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖,𝑡; 𝜽𝒊) = 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛾𝑖𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 − 𝐶⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡
2         (3) 
The sales agent i’s utility at time t, 𝑈𝑖𝑡 ⁡is derived from his compensation, 𝑊𝑖𝑡 which 
is assumed to be equal to his consumption. As shown in equation (3), the utility 
function is the quadratic form of 𝑊𝑖𝑡 conditioning on 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 and thus 𝑆𝑖𝑡, following 
the equation (1) and (2). And from now on, the sales response function (1) and the 
compensation scheme (2) for the sales agent i are parameterized as 𝜽𝒊 = {𝛾𝑖 , 𝐶, 𝜆, 𝜎}. 
Here, 𝛾𝑖 is a nonnegative risk aversion parameter for the sales agent i. I assume that 
the risk aversion degree differs in sales agents but is constant across the time. And I 
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add the disutility from exerting effort, adopting the common specification of cost as 
𝐶⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡
2  where 𝐶 is a nonnegative scalar. 
 Because the sales agent does not control the market variation 𝜖𝑡 ⁡,  his 
decision on which degree of selling effort to exert,⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is solely based on the 
expected utility over the market variation as below.   
𝐸𝜖𝑡 ⁡(𝑈𝑖,𝑡(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡; 𝜽)) = 𝐸(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) − 𝛾𝑖𝐸(𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 ) − 𝐶⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡
2 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
 The sales agent has the uncertainty over the realized sales 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 because of the 
market variation 𝜖𝑡. But once the sales are realized, the earning 𝑊𝑖,𝑡⁡and followingly 
the utility 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 ⁡is calculated exactly. And as the sales agent decides his effort level 
before the market variation realizes, he cares about the expected utility in (4) not the 
realized utility in (3).  
 Note that in the above concave utility function, the utility has a maximum 
point after which it decreases with increasing earning. Here, I assume that the utility 
is monotonically increasing with increasing earnings and ignore any satiation of 
utility. Thus, I confine the relationship between the utility and the earning before 




3.4. State Transitions  
There are two sources of dynamics in the model. First is the nonlinearity in the 
compensation scheme in period 3. The sales agent’s effort in period 1 and period 2 
affects the probability to earn a bonus in period 3. Thus, the sales agent cannot choose 
the optimal effort independently across the time. Second is the carryover term in the 
sales response function. As the current sales affect future sales by depreciating 
carryover terms, each period is not independent nor is each cycle of three time 
periods. Specifically, without carryover, there is no incentive to exert effort after 
getting the bonus in period 3 since the marginal utility is negative. However, with 
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the carryover in sales introduced, the sales agent considers the investment for future 
sales by exerting more effort than the single period optimal effort level. The sales 
agent thus has an incentive to exert effort even after achieving the quota in period 3 
because he wants to make the probability to get a bonus in the next cycle higher. 
Hence, the sales agent needs to take into account how current decision on effort 
affects his expected future compensation.  
 These dynamics are embedded in the transition of the three state variables: 
period type, ⁡𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,  sales from previous month, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1,⁡ and cumulative quota 
achievement up to the previous period,⁡𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 which is in [0,1]. At the beginning of 
time t, the sales agent chooses his optimal effort level in time t considering the 
expected income based on the state variables, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡.  
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = {𝑀𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5) 
 The first state variable⁡𝑀𝑡 , period type (or month type) in one cycle, is 
deterministic. ⁡𝑀𝑡 rotates as 1 → 2 → 3 → 1 → ⋯. As I assume all sales agents face 
the same period type at the same time t, I delete the subscript for individual sales 
agent i.  
𝑀𝑡 = {
𝑀𝑡−1 + 1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑀𝑡−1 = 1, 2
⁡1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6) 
 The second state variable 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, sales in the previous period, is to consider 
the carryover effect. In previous month, the realized sales following the equation (1) 
is saved for the second state variable in the next month.  
 The third state variable ⁡𝑄𝑖,(𝑡−1),  cumulative quota achievement up to 
previous period in one cycle, is a measure for how close the accumulation of sales 
to the quota. It is augmented by the realized sales each period, except at the end of 











Whereas the first variable, period type transits in a purely deterministic way, the 
latter two evolve in a stochastic way as they involve market random error term in 
sales response function (1).  
3.5. Optimal Choice of Effort 
Each sales agent chooses an effort level based on the state variables in the beginning 
of time t to maximize the discounted stream of expected utility flows, given the 
compensation plan 𝜳 , both the sales response function and the utility function 
parameterized with 𝜽. The present-discounted utility under the optimal effort policy 
can be represented by a value function that satisfies the following Bellman equation 
(8). The Bellman equation solves the optimal effort function eff conditional on 




{⁡𝑈(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡; 𝜽𝒊, 𝜳)
+ 𝛿𝑉(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,(𝑡+1)
′ |𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡; 𝜽𝒊,𝜳)⁡}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(8) 
 
4. Existence of Carryover  
In this chapter, I address the effect of carryover in sales on sales agents’ decision 
making under my setting. When carryover is introduced in sales response function, 
both expectation and variance of future sales increase compared to the model without 
carryover, given that the states and effort level are the same (i.e. 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
{𝑀𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1}⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡 are the same for the models with carryover or without 
carryover). This is the same argument as in Rubel and Prasad (2015). Let’s consider 
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the two sales response functions with and without sales carryover effect. Table 4 
compares the expectation and variance of future sales for two different models.  
         As shown in Table 4, the bigger the last period sales 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1⁡or the higher the 
carryover effect rate 𝜆, the more the sales agent expects for the next period’s sales 
and the more he should bear the uncertainty from the market variation. Therefore, 
for the sales agent, exerting effort and proportionally increasing realized sales can 
be explained as participating in the risky gambling. With higher risk but higher return 
from the carryover effect, the sales agents with different risk aversion degrees differ 
in decision making over optimal effort levels. The caveat here is that the above 
argument holds only when 𝑆𝑡−1 >  1. Otherwise, if 0 < 𝑆𝑡−1 < 1 , the carryover 
effect only decreases the expectation and the variance of future sales compared to 
the case without carryover effect. I allow 𝑆𝑡−1 to be between the range of [0.10, 
12.18], however, the optimal effort functions from solving the dynamic 
programming compute the simulated sales data above 1 for most of the cases for 
each of the different risk aversion degrees. For details, following Chapter 5 will 
demonstrate the specific data generation process and the result of simulated sales 
data for different risk aversion degrees.  
Table 3. Expectation and variance of future sales with/without carryover effect  
 
With carryover effect 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡−1
𝜆 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) 𝑒𝑥 𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) 
Without carryover effect 



















𝜆 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) 𝑒𝑥 𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) 
= 𝑆𝑡−1
2𝜆 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡)
2 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜎) (𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜎) − 1) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆𝑡) 
= 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) 𝑒𝑥 𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) 
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡)




5. Data Generation 
To generate the data, I build the hypothetical sales environment by setting parameters 
and variables as in Table 1 and Table 2. Then, I numerically solve dynamic 
programming in a discretized space and interpolate the space with Chebyshev 
polynomials of state variables. Using the optimal effort policy that I attain from 
solving dynamic programming, I forward-estimate the actions, here the effort levels, 
of 100 sales agents and get 60 periods of sales data which includes 20 cycles of bonus 
payment.  
5.1.  Parameter Setting and Discretization of Variables 
First step to generate the simulated data is to define the sales setting. To build the 
sales response function, compensation scheme, utility and value function, I set the 
true values of 8 parameters as in Table 2.  
 With the market variation term 𝜖 following normal distribution in the sales 
response function (1), realized sales 𝑆  are naturally continuous values and the 
cumulative quota achievements 𝑄 are followingly continuous. However, to solve 
dynamic programming with the numerical approach of simple approximation, one 
needs to discretize the state and action variables.  
 Among the three state variables, period type 𝑀𝑡 is already discrete; 𝑀𝑡 ∈
{1, 2, 3}. The time t can be infinite by repeating the cycles of three discrete period 
types infinitely. As t goes to infinite, 𝑀𝑡 changes as 1 → 2 → 3 → 1 → 2 → ⋯.⁡The 
second state variable 𝑆𝑖,𝑡⁡ is followingly discretized as I generate 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) first by 
equally spacing 100 points within the range of [-2, 2.5] and putting these points in 
the simple inverse function. Thus, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is restricted in (0.13, 12.19) with 100 points. 
As 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is calculated from 𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡(𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡)), almost all possible points of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 could not 
be represented in less than 6 decimal places, such as 0.13535353…. So here, the 
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open parenthesis in the range of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 reflects the lengthy decimal places or irrational 
numbers of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡. The third state variable 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is generated by calculating all possible 
combination of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 in one cycle and adding zero point. In my setting, the quota q is 
10 and the realized sales are bound below around 12.18. Thus, the maximum 
accumulated sales for three periods are theoretically above 36, which results in 
maximum 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 above 7 in the third period. However, as I discretize sales through 
equally spaced log transformed sales, sales below 5 are much denser. There are only 
20 points in (5, 12.19) among 100 points in 𝑆𝑖,𝑡. Thus, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is arranged much denser 
below 1.5 and sparser above 1.5 and below 7.  
 The finite grids in the 3-dimensional state space are all possible 5275 
combinations of three state variables. The finite points in the 1-dimensional action 
space are 30 possible effort values. I design action space with 30 equally spaced 
points in the range of [0, 1] and for the simplicity I use ⁡𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡|𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) =
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡). So, the sales response function is represented hereafter as the below 
function (1)’.  
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + √𝜎𝜖𝑡    (1)’ 
5.2.  Solving the Dynamic Programming  
After discretizing the state and action variables, I solve the dynamic programming 
with a numerical approach of successive approximation following Rust (1996). 
Solving the dynamic programming is to find the optimal action policy given a state. 
The optimal effort policy for 5275 states is the function of a state which given a state, 
chooses the level of effort giving the maximum expected utility among 30 different 
effort levels. Hence, the sales agent’s optimal effort policy function has the domain 
of 5275 states and the range of 30 effort levels.  
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 Remember that the state variables at the beginning of time t, 
{𝑀𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1} are the period type at time t, the lagged sales from the previous 
time (𝑡 − 1) and the percentage of quota achievement till the last time ⁡(𝑡 − 1) . 
Given a state at the beginning of time t,⁡{𝑀𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1}, the sales agent could 
expect the probability of state transition to another state {𝑀𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡} based on 
the distribution of market variation in sales response function (1). This is because 
𝑀𝑡 changes in a deterministic way and⁡𝑄𝑖,𝑡 has a one-to-one relation with 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , and 
henceforth, the market variation in the sales response function (1) explains all 
probabilities in the state transition.  
 I construct 30 state transition matrices which sizes are 5275 by 5275 for 30 
different effort levels. With one effort level fixed, I could build a 5275 by 5275 state 
transition matrix which (i, j)-element represents the probability of transition from 
state i to state j. For example, with the effort level at 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡  and given a state 
{𝑀𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1} , the log transformed next time realized sales 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  follows the 
normal distribution with the mean, 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) and the variance of 𝜎, which 
are all known with known parameters λ⁡and⁡σ. Based on this distribution of sales, I 
calculate 5275 discrete probabilities for each effort fixed given a state and normalize 
them to make them conform to the axioms of probabilities. After building the 
transition matrices, the optimal effort policy comes out followingly. With 30 
transition matrices, given a state, I could calculate 30 expected utilities from (4) in a 
probabilistic way and could choose one optimal effort level which gives the highest 
expected utility among 30 effort levels. 
 I solve the optimal effort policy by successive approximation. As shown in 
Rust (1996), the solution to infinite horizon Markov-Chain dynamic programming 
problems is mathematically equivalent to computing a fixed point of the Bellman 
operator. Guaranteed by the contraction mapping theorem, I approach the solution 
starting with an arbitrary initial guess. I set the tolerance level at 1e-5 and iterate 
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until the solution converges within the tolerance level. As a result, I attain a vector 
of optimal effort policy for 5275 different states.  
5.3. Interpolation 
After solving the dynamic programming, I interpolate the solution space to predict 
the optimal effort level from any continuous states other than 5275 discrete states. 
This step is necessary because while generating the sales data with random market 
errors, the state variables, specifically the sales and the quota achievement could be 
any continuous values other than 5275 discrete values.  
 For interpolation, I first try using the simple linear regression with the 
orthogonal polynomials of state variables. As the main purpose here is to predict the 
optimal effort level in the neighborhood of discrete space, I could expand the 
regressor set sufficiently enough to make the R-square close to 1. However, the three 
state variables show high multicollinearity, especially sales quantity and cumulative 
quota achievement in percentage have a highly positive correlation. And this 
condition requires so many high-ordered terms if I expand the regressor set only with 
the standard 1, x, x2…⁡polynomials and even they do not contribute to large marginal 
increases in R-square. Thus, I follow a hint from Chung et al (2014) which links 
unobservable effort and observable states with a nonparametric model of effort 
function in their estimation stage with the real data. They model nonparametric effort 
function with Chebyshev polynomials of state variables to estimate conditional 
choice probabilities. I follow using Chebyshev polynomials of state variables and 
use these orthogonal basis functions to expand the regressor set with fewer regressors 
so as to relieve concern for multicollinearity among state variables.  
 In order to restrict the predicted effort values between 0 and 1, I re-
parameterize the effort values x⁡ as y = ln (
x
1−x
). Thus, the set of the Chebyshev 
polynomials of sales and cumulative quota achievement, dummy variables for period 
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types and their interaction terms explains re-parameterized y in a linear regression, 
restricting the effort level x in the range of (0, 1). The challenge here is that the 
optimal solutions for 5275 discrete states are not smooth, and thus even the 
orthogonal polynomials could not make R-square reach above 0.7. Therefore, I need 
to add up additive dummy variables to split the data points with eye measurement, 
seeing the data points on the graph and comparing them with the interpolated surface. 
After some adjustments, the resulting R-square for two different risk aversion cases 
(high/low) becomes 0.9090319 and 0.8611435, respectively.  
 I also try using the nearest neighborhood interpolation. I first match the 
month type then I find the nearest neighbor of 2-dimensional vector (i.e. sales and 
quota achievement rate) with the Euclidean distance measure. As I use 1-nearest 
neighborhood, in sample explanation of original 5275 data increases compared to 
the linear regression with basis functions. The two data sets generated by different 
interpolation methods show some differences. Specifically, sales performance 
generated from 1-nearest neighborhood interpolation shows that sales agents 
perform the best in every third period while sales performance generated from the 
linear regression shows that sales agents perform the best in every second period. 
This could be interpreted as the identification in the data generation process is 
approved. However, the focal interest in my simulation is the differences in mean 
and variance of sales performance among two types of sales agents, the highly risk 
averse or the less risk averse. And the interpolation methods change little between 
the two groups. The less risk averse show higher variance and higher mean while the 
highly risk averse show lower mean and lower variance. Thus, I keep the data 
generated by the linear regression with orthogonal polynomials and use this data for 





5.4.  Sales data with the Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion factors  
Given the continuous optimal policy function from interpolation, I generate sales 
data of 60 time periods by 100 sales agents with one of two risk aversion degrees; 
60 sales agents have high risk aversion of 3 and the other 40 sales agents have low 
risk aversion of 0.01. Since I only use the first half of the quadratic utility function 




I explain earlier. The maximum value of 𝑊𝑡 is 0.15 when achieving the bonus in 
month 3. Therefore, the risk aversion degree should be below 3.33 to keep the utility 
function monotonically increasing. As the sales agents are risk averse following the 
literatures, the risk aversion factor should always be above zero. And to make 
segregation of one group from another clear and easy, I set the degree of less risk 
aversion at 0.01 which seems close to the risk neutrality.  
 I forward simulate the actions of the sales agents up to 160 times using the 
interpolated value functions starting with the initial state (1, 0, 0): in period 1, with 
no lagged sales and zero accumulated quota achievement. The first 100 sales data 
are burned in and the latter 60-period sales data for 100 sales agents are saved. The 
plotting of sales data shows that only 5-period burn-in is enough to confirm the 
stability.  
5.5. Summary Statistics of Data 
The simulated sales data for 100 sales agents are shown in Figure 3. The sales agents 
with low risk aversion perform better in average in terms of making sales. However, 
they have higher variance of performance compared to the counterpart with low risk 
aversion. The sales are steadier for the highly risk averse than for the less risk averse.  
 The introduction of sales carryover results in different sales patterns 
compared to the previous literature. In Misra and Nair (2011) without sales carryover, 
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the sales pattern has a spike at the end of quarters suggesting that agents tend to 
increase effort as they reach closer to quota. However, in my simulated data with the 
sales carryover introduced, the sales pattern has a spike rather in the beginning of 
quarters in month 1. Across all risk aversion degrees, the sales agent in average 
makes the biggest performance in month 1 while realizing the least amount of sales 
in month 2. In month 3 when the bonus is to be given out based on the quota 
achievement, a little increase of sales from previous month is shown in the graph.  
 Also, as in Table 4, the sales agent makes sales even after achieving quota 
in month 3. In the end of month 3, a new cycle of sales starts with zero cumulative 
quota achievement. However, as the sales agent expects the carryover of sales to the 
next cycle which affects the chance to reach the quota in the next quarter, he still 
















Figure 1. Sales performance by sales agents with high/low risk aversion 
(a) Sales data from 100 sales agents 
1. The grey vertical lines indicate period type 3 when the bonus payment is given according to the 
quota achievement.  
2. The red lines on the upper level indicates the sales performance by 40 less risk averse sales 
agents.  
3. The green lines on the bottom indicates the sales performance by 60 highly risk averse sales 
agents.  
 
(b) 95% range of sales for high/low risk aversion 
1. The grey vertical lines indicate period type 3 when the bonus payment is given according to the 
quota achievement.  
2. The red lines on the upper level indicates the sales performance by 40 less risk averse sales 
agents.  
3. The green lines on the bottom indicates the sales performance by 60 highly risk averse sales 
agents.  
4. The bold lines are the means for sales by the same group of sales agents with respect to the risk 
aversion degree.  
5. The dotted lines are upper/lower bound for 95% confidence interval of the sales by the same 
group of sales agents with respect to the risk aversion degree.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the simulated data 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Number of sales agents 100    
Periods of time 60    
All sales agents 100     
Wealth for one quarter (end of quarter) 0.0295 0.0520 0.0065 0.2000 
Number of times achieving bonus 1.38 5.4335 0 11 
Sales in month 1 (end of month) 2.2470 2.0030 0.6605 10.780 
Sales in month 2 (end of month) 1.8130 1.4482 0.5562 8.1660 
Sales in month 3 (end of month) 1.7980 1.3385 0.6535 5.8340 
Cumulative sales in month 3 (end of month) 3.611 1.3304 1.357 12.420 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 2 
(beginning of month) 
0.2244 0.2002 0.0660 1.0780 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 3 
(beginning of month) 
0.4057 0.3387 0.1217 1.7940 
Sales agents with high risk aversion 60    
Wealth for one quarter (end of quarter) 0.0150 0.0094 0.0065 0.0342 
Number of times achieving bonus 0 0 0 0 
Sales in month 1 (end of month) 1.7230 1.1822 0.6605 4.0070 
Sales in month 2 (end of month) 1.5090 1.0352 0.5562 3.2590 
Cumulative sales in month 3 (end of month) 3.016 0.7238 1.357 6.401 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 2 
(beginning of month) 
0.1719 0.1177 0.0660 0.3913 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 3 
(beginning of month) 
0.3228 0.2170 0.1217 0.6670 
Sales agents with low risk aversion 40    
Wealth for one quarter (end of quarter) 0.0513 0.0814 0.0067 0.2 
Number of times achieving bonus 3.45 0.0814 0 11 
Sales in month 1 (end of month) 3.0320 2.7328 0.7606 10.78 
Sales in month 2 (end of month) 2.2680 1.7423 0.7417 8.1660 
Cumulative sales in month 3 (end of month) 4.503 1.5202 1.496 12.420 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 2 
(beginning of month) 
0.3032 0.2735 0.0760 1.0780 
Cumulative quota achievement in month 3 
(beginning of month) 





Using the generated sales data with heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion, I 
estimated the dynamic model following the recent two-step conditional choice 
probabilities (CCP) approach with unobserved heterogeneity of Arcidiacono and 
Miller (2011). The two-step CCP approach in the dynamic model is first introduced 
by Hotz and Miller (1993) and is extended by Bajari et al (2007), overcoming the 
computational burden in the nested fixed-point algorithm of Rust (1987). Notably, 
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) utilized expectation-maximization algorithm to 
accommodate the unobserved heterogeneity in the first step of estimation. Here, I 
follow Arcidiacono and Miller to estimate the segment-wise structural models. 
Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir (2014) extended the empirical validity of 
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) under the context of the effort allocation of sales 
agents as in my case, but with different compensation scheme and without sales 
carryover effect. I first estimate the parameters acknowledging the existence of 
carryover effect and then compare the results with those estimated ignoring the 
carryover effect.  
6.1 The first step: effort and sales response functions for each 
segment 
The unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion affects the optimal effort policies and 
thus the realized sales. Using the EM algorithm, I segment the sales agents with 
respect to their optimal effort policies in sales response functions.  
 Below is the sales response function for sales agent i in segment s at time t.  
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑠(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕) + 𝜆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + √𝜎𝜖𝑖,𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1)′′ 
Only the optimal effort function differs across segments while other parameters 
𝜆, 𝜎⁡remain the same for all sales agents regardless of the segment. Considering the 
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effort is a decision by sales agents given the current state variables, a nonparametric 
model of effort function using the combination of Chebyshev polynomial basis 
functions from the state variables is possible. Chung et al (2014) employs Chebyshev 
basis functions to map between observable states and actions including unobservable 
effort functions. Here, I follow Chung et al (2014) to represent the unobservable 
effort with observable states nonparametrically. Note that I already use the 
orthogonal basis function in data generation process with interpolation. Here, in the 
estimation stage, the estimated effort function could be different from the linear 
regression model in interpolation. The nonparametric effort function for sales agent 
i in segment s at time t is as below where 𝜌𝑠,𝑚⁡is the Chebyshev polynomial of degree 
m in segment s.  




Therefore, the sales response function for segment s becomes, 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = ∑ 𝛾𝑠,𝑚𝜌𝑠,𝑚(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕)
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝜆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + √𝜎𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1)′′′ 
and 𝚯𝐬 = {𝛄𝐬, 𝜆, 𝜎}, the set of parameters given the order of Chebyshev polynomial 
basis m and the segment s for sales agent i is to be estimated. To be clear,  𝛄𝐬 is the 
vector of coefficients of Chebyshev polynomial basis and is the only parameter 
varying across the segment s. Thus, heterogeneity across segments comes in the sales 
response function only through 𝛄𝐬.⁡ 
 Assume that sales agent i belongs to one of S segments, 𝑠 ∈ {1,… , 𝑆} with 
segment probabilities 𝑞𝑖 = {𝑞𝑖1, … , 𝑞𝑖𝑆}. Let the population probability of being in 
segment s be πs . Then, the likelihood of individual i making 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) at time t, 
conditional on the observed states, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕 and unobservable segment s is, 
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𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝐿(𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡)⁡⁡|⁡𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕, 𝑠; ⁡𝜣𝒔)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(10)⁡ 
And the likelihood of observing sales history 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖) over the time period (t = 1,… ,T), 
given the observable state history 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 and the unobservable segment s, is given 
by,  
𝐿𝑖𝑠 = 𝐿(ln⁡(𝑆𝑖)|𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊; 𝜣𝒔, 𝜋𝑠) = 𝜋𝑠(∏ 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 )⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(11)               
Overall, the likelihood of individual i is obtained by summing over all the 
unobserved segments⁡𝑠 ∈ {1,… , 𝑆}. 
𝐿𝑖 = ⁡⁡𝐿(𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖)⁡|𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊;𝜣, 𝝅) = ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(12)                 
Hence, the log-likelihood over the N sample of individuals becomes, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝐿) = ∑ log⁡(𝐿𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 )⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(13)                 
 Since maximizing the above exact log likelihood is computationally 
infeasible, I follow Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to maximize the alternative, the 













 Given λ, and model specification of effort function, I iteratively search for 
𝜎 and 𝜸 by updating 𝝅⁡with q until the loglikelihood converges. The process at the 
(𝑚 + 1)𝑡ℎ  iteration after getting parameters {𝜣𝒔
𝒎, 𝝅𝒎}  from 𝑚𝑡ℎ  iteration is as 
follows:  
(1) With {𝜣𝒔
𝒎, 𝝅𝒎}, compute 𝑞𝑖𝑠













𝑚+1, obtain 𝜣𝒎+𝟏 by maximizing A where 𝜣𝒎+𝟏 =
{𝜸𝒎+𝟏, 𝜆, 𝜎𝑚+1}.  
Note that 𝜆 is given in this algorithm, which means 𝜆 never updates but is 
fixed.           
1) With 𝑞𝑖𝑠
𝑚+1, compute coefficients 𝛄𝐦+𝟏 from the weighted least squares. 
2) With 𝛄𝐦+𝟏, update 𝜎𝑚+1 from minimizing sum of squares of residuals 
in linear regression. 
(3) Update 𝝅𝒎+𝟏 by taking the average of 𝑞𝑖𝑠










 I iterate (1) to (3) till the loglikelihood converges with the tolerance level at 
1e-5. The initial value needed to start the iteration is only q. This is because I use the 
residuals as new regressand by subtracting carryover term from the sales 
performance (note that 𝜆 is given) and compute weighted least squares with q being 
weights. And the initial values of the segment probabilities q are set equally across 
segments and sales agents. After convergence, I get the final estimate of 𝜣?̂? and 𝝅?̂? 
for all segments. Hence, from 𝜣?̂?,⁡ I can set the effort function for all segments 
𝑒𝑓?̂?𝑠(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆) , and thus complete the sales response function for all segments 
?̂?𝑠(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆). Also from ?̂?𝐬, I now know the population probabilities of all segments. 
The probability of individual i in segment s, 𝑞𝑖𝑠 is no longer in use: it just helps 
calculate the main parameters in the sales response function and the population 
probabilities. Again, the segment-wise parameters are only the coefficients of effort 
function, 𝛄𝐬.  
 The next step is to find the optimal λ given model specification of effort 
function. The above iterative process is the function of λ  and I optimize λ  by 
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maximizing the converged loglikelihood resulting from above EM algorithm. I use 
basic optim function in R with BFGS method.  
 Lastly, the model specification of effort function should be chosen. I try 
47988 combinations of Chebyshev polynomials and the number of segments. I build 
the regressor set with Chebyshev polynomials of state variables whose degrees vary 
from one to 6 and whose combinations with month type dummies vary from case 1 
to case 6. Thus, for each segment, I build 36 cases of effort function and as I try the 
number of segments from one to 3, I build 36 + 362 + 363 = 47988 numbers of 
effort function specifications. This does not cover every possible combination for 
effort function model specification. However, I believe that this number of trials in 
model selection procedure is large enough. Among 47988 candidate model 
specifications, I choose one with the lowest BIC and continue to estimate segment-
wise utility functions with chosen effort function specification.  
6.2 The second step: utility functions for each segment 
The second stage is to find the structural parameters that rationalize the optimal 
actions estimated in the first stage (i.e. estimated segment-wise effort functions and 
estimated segment-wise sales response functions). Below is the utility function of a 
representative agent in segment s at time t with 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕  who conforms to the 
estimated optimal effort 𝑒𝑓?̂?𝑠𝑡(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕)  and thus the estimated sales response 
function ?̂?𝑠𝑡(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕), both parameterized with the set⁡?̂?𝒔.  
𝑈𝑠𝑡 = 𝑈𝑠𝑡(𝑆𝑠𝑡(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕); ?̂?𝒔) = 𝐸(𝑊𝑡) − 𝜸𝒔𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑡) − 𝑐𝑒𝑓?̂?𝑠𝑡(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕)⁡, ∀𝑠
= {1,… , 𝑆}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(14) 
 The value function is the expected sum of utility flows over infinite time 
periods. The expectation operator is over the sales shock 𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0,1) . The 
value function for a representative agent in segment s at time t with 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕 is, 
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𝑉𝑠 = 𝑉𝑠(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕; ?̂?𝒔, 𝜦𝒔) = ⁡𝐸{∑ 𝛿
𝑡𝑈𝑠𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 }                           (15), 
where 𝛿 is the time discount factor and 𝜦𝒔 is the parameter set for the utility function 
of segment s. Specifically, 𝜦𝒔 = {𝜸𝒔, 𝑐} . Here, I assume that the cost of exerting 
effort c is known and thus focus on the estimation of risk aversion factors 𝜸𝒔⁡among 
different segments. As segment probabilities ?̂? is estimated in the first stage, I can 
simplify the value function for segments as below.  





𝑠=1                     (15)’, 
As in the conventional dynamic estimation, I assume that the time discount factor 𝛿 
as 0.95 which here is the same as the true parameter for data generation. 
 I first construct the optimal value function for each segment. Using the 
estimated policy functions and the sales response function from the first stage and 
with the distribution of the sales shock ϵ known, I carry out the forward-simulation 
of the actions of sales agents and construct the value function of agents. In my setting, 
sales agents are in the infinite cycle of time horizon. However, in the estimation, I 
believe that the finite time up to 60 is enough to retain the value function.  
 The detailed forward simulation is as follows.  
(1) From initial state 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕, calculate the optimal actions as 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑠?̂?(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕). 
(2) Draw sales shock 𝜖𝑡 from the standard normal distribution.  
(3) Update state 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕+𝟏, using the realized sales ?̂? (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑠?̂?(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕)) + 𝜖𝑡 
I iterate from (1) to (3) till t=60. Then I average the sum of discounted utility flows 
over 60 periods, which becomes the estimate of the value function 
𝑉?̂?(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆; 𝑒𝑓𝑓?̂?(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆); ?̂?𝒔, 𝜦𝑺) . Then with the estimated segment probabilities, I 
could calculate ?̂?(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆) with the optimal effort policy. For the state variables in the 
34 
 
value functions ?̂?, I choose 5275 discretized states used in data generation, and hence 
could derive 5275 value function outputs.  
 To estimate the utility parameters 𝜦, I perturb the optimal effort policies in 
200 different ways which could be parameterized as 𝜽𝒊
′ for i = 1, …, 200. Then I 
derive 200 perturbed value functions for the same 5275 states but with the perturbed 
effort policies up to t=60. Then the difference in the optimal value function and one 
of perturbed value function is retained as below.  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑉(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕; ?̂?, 𝜦) − 𝑉(𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒕; 𝜽𝒊
′, 𝜦)⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = {1,… ,200}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(16) 
 As the value function with optimal action function is never less than that 
with deviated action function, 𝑄𝑖 is always greater than or equal to zero. Thus, I 









The above objective function minimizes the case where the deviated value function 
is greater than the optimal value function based on the first stage estimates. Here, I 
set the same market errors 𝜖𝑡 at each t between the optimal and the deviated value 
function to minimize the effect from random errors on forward simulation.  
 To find the standard errors of second stage parameters, I follow the two-
stage dynamic estimation of Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). I numerically find 
the gradients and the hessians of the objective functions in the first stage and in the 
second stage and then multiply adequate matrices for the standard errors of the 






I estimate the sales response functions and the utility functions in segment-wise. 
Especially, to check the effect of carryover in the estimation, I first conduct the 
estimation knowing the existence of carryover in equation (1)′′. And then I conduct 
the estimation ignoring the existence of carryover in equation (1)′′. (i.e. I set λ = 0.) 
Thus, the number of parameters in the first approach knowing the carryover is one 
larger than that in the second approach ignoring the carryover. And note that to 
minimize the effect from random errors on forward simulation in the second stage 
estimation, I give the same market shock 𝜖𝑡 ⁡at the same time t for both of the two 
approaches. 
 The results from the two approaches are in Table 5 and Table 6. The critical 
difference of the two approaches is in describing the heterogeneity of sales agents. 
When ignoring the carryover, I could not get the true numbers of segments in sales 
agents while acknowledging the carryover leads to the right segmentation of sales 
agents. Ignoring the carryover while it exists concludes that the number of segments 
is three while the true number is two. It seems that ignoring the carryover divides the 
less risk averse group in another two segments. However, acknowledging the 
carryover concludes that there are two segments, which is correct and moreover, the 
estimated segment sizes are close to true sizes based on the three-sigma rule.  
 Besides the segmentation, both the two approaches estimate the first stage 
parameters for sales response function well. The market variation σ is estimated 
close to true sizes based on the three -sigma rule. Also, estimating carryover factor 
is successful in the case of not ignoring carryover.  
 The focused heterogeneous parameters, risk aversion factors γ are estimated 
in segment-wise. The estimates when the carryover is ignored are poorer than those 
when the carryover is not ignored. This is because ignoring carryover results in 
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wrong segmenting of the sales agents in the first stage estimation and thus affects 
the second stage estimation. However, the problem with the true approach of not 
ignoring the carryover is represented with too small standard errors in the second 
stage to include the true value based on three-sigma rule. I could not confirm that the 
estimated risk aversion factors are in the 95% bounds roughly calculated by the 
three-sigma rule. The plausible reason of this poor estimate could be in the 
interpolation while generating the data. With linear regression of orthogonal 
polynomials, I could make the R-square high as 0.87 but this would not be enough 
to interpolate well for generating the simulated data. I admit that the simulated data 
itself could lack accuracy for continuous values. But still, the different degrees of 
risk aversion result in the different patterns in the sales performance and also affect 
the estimation as to finding the right segmentation of sales agents.   
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Table 5. Parameter Estimates when ignoring the carryover 
   (a) Effort Policy Function 
Variable Segment 1 variable Segment 2 variable Segment 3 
 estimate s.e.  estimate s.e.  estimate s.e. 
Segment Size 0.59658 0.008201  0.21640 0.039836  0.18701 - 
Intercept 1234.813 67.0126 Intercept -398.129 77.9950 Intercept 111.510 203.2984 
𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸) -2399.200 195.7339 𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸) -1535.39 5537.7350 𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸) -158.894 292.6718 
𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸) 1597.203 62.6342 𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸) -596.463 52.9197 𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸) 138.196 252.3204 
𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸) -1011.740 83.7153 𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸) -506.958 1840.3720 𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸) -52.501 93.5652 
𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸) 363.184 94.1653 𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸) -198.329 114.2758 𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸) 27.500 49.53079 
𝝆𝟓(𝑸𝑸) -130.452 80.7166 𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸)D2 2045.539 5622.4610 𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸)D3 116.300 2551.2880 
𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸)D2 21023.850 1767.6270 𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸)D2 99.018 163.4155 𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸)D3 19.540 266.0624 
𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸)D2 -157.279 176.4500 𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸)D2 668.131 1864.0100 𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸)D3 32.136 781.2688 
𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸)D2 11148.310 140.9823 𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸)D2 97.688 161.9900 𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸)D3 18.797 256.9963 
𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸)D2 -156.125 195.9997       
𝝆𝟓(𝑸𝑸)D2 2473.325 389.0482       
 
1. ρi(x) is a Chebyshev polynomial of x in degree i.  
2. D2 is a dummy for month 2 and D3 is a dummy for month 3. 
3. For the segment size, I re-parameterized it to restrict each segment probability set between 0 and 
1 and to restrict the sum of all probabilities to be 1. In the parenthesis, the numbers represent the 
original 0 to 1 scaled probabilities. The standard errors are estimated from the re-parameterized 
estimates. For segment size s, the degree of freedom in the segment size parameters is (s-1).   
 
 
   (b) Sales Response Function 
Variable True Estimates S.E. 
Market variation 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎) -4.6051701 -4.4290700 0.247632 
 
 (c) Utility Function 
Variable  True Estimates S.E. 
Degree of risk 
aversion ln⁡(γ) 
Segment 1 0.9162907 0.8979649 149281.22 
Segment 2 0.8979649 -6.7696002 50200.55 




Table 6. Parameter Estimates when the carryover is considered 
(a) Effort Policy Function 
Variable Segment 1 Variable Segment 2 
 estimate s.e.  estimate s.e. 
Segment size 0.600073 3.2298326 Segment size 0.399926 - 
Intercept -0.509415 7.2236407 Intercept 10710.120000 2561.7985191 
𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸) 0.068084 2.4367443 𝝆𝟐(𝒍𝑺) -54.184310 79.3302963 
𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸) 0.116181 1.4478691 𝝆𝟑(𝒍𝑺) 80.228980 119.2318990 
𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸) -0.579343 6.4755045 𝝆𝟒(𝒍𝑺) -66.648260 95.9185972 
   𝝆𝟓(𝒍𝑺) 33.538480 44.7543617 
   𝝆𝟔(𝒍𝑺) -8.923251 10.5407782 
   𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸) -43239.860000 4260.7158659 
   𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸) 13734.970000 819.7258859 
   𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸) -20610.630000 1771.4441268 
   𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸) 2844.845000 5420.6278698 
   𝝆𝟓(𝑸𝑸) -3736.519000 1854.5409511 
   𝝆𝟔(𝑸𝑸) -193.953400 2035.0883214 
   𝝆𝟏(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 113.225000 3927.5961629 
   𝝆𝟐(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 -75.167370 4592.0007876 
   𝝆𝟑(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 27.480220 4879.2056869 
   𝝆𝟒(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 9.374336 3227.2296625 
   𝝆𝟓(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 -16.051850 1238.6402853 
   𝝆𝟔(𝒍𝑺)𝑫𝟑 7.049693 225.3571797 
   𝝆𝟏(𝑸𝑸)𝑫𝟑 24114.700000 6929.6557366 
   𝝆𝟐(𝑸𝑸)𝑫𝟑 933.646800 2271.6124171 
   𝝆𝟑(𝑸𝑸)𝑫𝟑 12003.410000 871.4757618 
   𝝆𝟒(𝑸𝑸)𝑫𝟑 1420.884000 2107.7915178 
   𝝆𝟓(𝑸𝑸)𝑫𝟑 2366.065000 1077.9405320 




1. ρi(x) is a Chebyshev polynomial of x in degree i.  
2. D2 is a dummy for month 2 and D3 is a dummy for month 3. 
3. For the segment size, I re-parameterized it to restrict each segment probability set between 0 and 
1 and to restrict the sum of all probabilities to be 1. In the parenthesis, the numbers represent the 
original 0 to 1 scaled probabilities. The standard errors are estimated from the re-parameterized 
estimates. For segment size s, the degree of freedom in the segment size parameters is (s-1).   
 
 
(b) Sales Response Function 
 






0 -0.0219450 0.6234153 
Market variation 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎) -4.6051701 -4.5803730 0.2043847 
 
  (c) Utility Function 
Variable  True Estimates S.E. 




Segment 1 0.9162907 0.8560872 0.0003319 




Personal selling is a primary marketing mix tool for research on how the 
compensation plan motivates the sales force and affects performance. But literatures 
have focused mainly on principal-agent framework or certain compositions of 
compensation features to discuss the effect of it. However, this paper allows the 
existence of carryover in sales, which is pervasive in industries. In addition of 
forward-looking behavior derived from quota-based compensation, carryover in 
sales adds up dynamics of sales agent’s effort allocation varying across the level of 
risk aversion of sales agents.  
 From the simulation, I show that the different levels of risk aversion resulted 
in the different optimal effort policy functions and thus in different patterns of 
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realized sales of sales agents. The highly risk averse set the base line of performance 
while the less risk averse fluctuate their sales above the highly risk averse. The 
frequency of achieving quotas is higher in the less risk averse group compared to the 
highly risk averse group. As the variance and the mean of future sales increase 
because of the presence of carryover, the highly risk averse try not to exert more 
effort to avoid the uncertainty from the increased sales.  
 Moreover, from the two-step estimation of structural parameters in the 
simulated data, I confirm that ignoring the carryover factor in the sales results in the 
wrong segment of sales agents in the first stage and thus the wrong estimates of risk 
aversion in the second stage. Thus, the presence of carryover in sales affects the 
estimation results significantly.  
 As shown in the simulated data, the degree of risk aversion derives the 
different patterns of performance in sales. It is shown that the less risk averse endure 
the uncertainty of increased future sales and exert more effort trying to achieve 
quotas for bonuses. Thus, from the sales data, the managers can easily conclude that 
the less risk averse are high-performers in the firm. For the future research, I want to 
show that in the presence of carryover, if the firm’s quota-bonus plan might function 
as a filter through which only the less risk-averse are let in. By letting the sales agents 
getting in and out of sales agent pool freely, we can check whether the carryover 
affects the function of sales compensation as a filter. Using the contraction theory, 
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APPENDIX.   Computing the expected utility function  
Expectation and Variance of Wealth in Utility Function 
𝑊𝑡(𝑆𝑡) = {
𝑟𝑆𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ⁡1, 2
𝐼(𝑄𝑡 ≥ 1)(𝑟𝑞 + 𝐵) + 𝐼(𝑄𝑡 < 1)𝑟𝑆𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ⁡3⁡⁡
 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝑡−1
𝜆 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)
𝑞
 
let, 𝐶1 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝑡−1










= 𝐸(𝐼(𝑄𝑡 < 1) ∗ 𝐶1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑄𝑡 ≥ 1) ∗ 𝐶2) 
= 𝐶1 ∗ 𝐸(𝐼(𝑄𝑡 < 1) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) + 𝐶2 ∗ 𝑃(𝑄𝑡 ≥ 1) 
= 𝐶1 ∗ 𝐸 (𝐼 ((𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝑡−1
𝜆 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)
𝑞
) < 1) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) 
+𝐶2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟 ((𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝑡−1
𝜆 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)
𝑞
≥ 1)) 
= 𝐶1 ∗ 𝐸(𝐼(𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) < 𝐶3) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) + 𝐶2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) ≥ 𝐶3) 
𝑖𝑓, 𝑄𝑡−1 < 1 
𝐸(𝑊𝑡) = 𝐶1 ∗ 𝐸 (𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) |𝜖𝑡 <
1
√𝜎




























































= 𝐶1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡(
𝜎
2
) ∗ 𝛷 (
1
√𝜎





𝑖𝑓, 𝑄𝑡−1 ≥ 1 




= 𝐸(𝐼(𝑄𝑡 < 1) ∗ 𝐶1
2 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(2√𝜎𝜖𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑄𝑡 ≥ 1) ∗ 𝐶2
2) 
= 𝐶1
2 ∗ 𝐸(𝐼(𝑄𝑡 < 1) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) + 𝐶2
2 ∗ 𝑃(𝑄𝑡 ≥ 1) 
= 𝐶1
2 ∗ 𝐸 (𝐼 ((𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝑡−1
𝜆 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)
𝑞
) < 1) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) 
+𝐶2
2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟 ((𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝑡−1




2 ∗ 𝐸(𝐼(𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) < 𝐶3) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡)) + 𝐶2
2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝑒𝑥𝑝(√𝜎𝜖𝑡) ≥ 𝐶3) 
𝑖𝑓, 𝑄𝑡−1 < 1 
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국 문 초 록 
 
판매 이월 효과와 위험 회피도 
: 영업사원 보상 체계에서의 동적 인센티브 
 
천하영 




지난 시기로부터 판매의 이월 효과가 있는 경우, 쿼터-보너스 결합의 
보상체계 하에서 영업사원이 본인의 영업 노력 배분을 이산적 (discrete), 
동태적 (dynamic)으로 어떻게 결정하는지 풀어 보았다. 다이나믹 
프로그래밍 (dynamic programming)을 통해 얻은 해를 바탕으로 영업 
사원을 두 가지 그룹으로 구분하여 영업 데이터를 만들었다: 한 그룹은 위험 
회피 정도가 높고, 다른 한 그룹은 위험 회피 정도가 낮게 설계하였다. 판매의 
이월효과가 다음 시기 판매량의 기대값 뿐만 아니라 그 분산도 높이기 때문에, 
영업사원에게 최적의 영업 노력 배분과 이에 따른 판매량 형태는 위험 회피 
정도에 따라 달라진다. 위험 회피 정도가 높은 그룹의 영업 사원이 판매량의 
기본을 맞추고, 위험 회피 정도가 낮은 그룹의 영업사원이 전자의 판매량을 
넘어 요동치는 판매량을 기록한다. 또한 쿼터 달성 빈도도 위험 회피 정도가 
낮은 그룹이 그렇지 않은 그룹에 비해 더 높았다. 이렇게 다른 판매량 추이는 
위험 회피 정도가 높은 집단이 판매량을 늘릴 때 증가하는 불확실성 
 
 
(uncertainty)를 피하기 위해 노력을 더 많이 투입하지 않도록 조절하는 
것으로 설명 가능하다.  
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011)를 따라 그룹마다 최적 노력 배분 함수와 
효용 함수를 두 단계에 걸쳐 추정해 보았다: 비모수 함수를 통해 조건부 선택 
확률 (conditional choice probability)를 계산하고, EM 알고리즘을 통해 
구조적 모수 (structural parameters)를 추정하였다. 추정 결과는 판매의 
이월 효과가 존재하는데 이를 무시하고 추정했을 경우 영업사원의 그룹을 
그 수와 크기 모두에 있어서 잘 추정하지 못한다는 것이다. 그 이유는 판매의 
이월 효과를 무시하면 첫 번째 추정 단계에서 영업사원을 제대로 그룹화하지 
못하고 따라서 이어지는 두 번째 추정에도 영향을 미치기 때문이다. 추정 
결과는 판매의 이월 효과가 존재하는 경우에 영업부의 판매량 추이를 제대로 
이해하기 위해선 판매의 이월 효과를 충분히 검토해야 한다는 것을 강조한다. 
판매의 이월 효과를 무시하게 되면, 영업 사원을 세분화 하지 못해서 세분 
그룹별 보상 체계를 설계할 때 비효율성을 낳게 된다.  
 
주요어: 영업사원 보상체계, 다이나믹 프로그래밍, 이월효과, 위험회피도, 
이질성, 2 단계 CCP 측정, 시뮬레이션 
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